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Abstract
Postcolonial theory has tended to focus on those spaces where European colonialism has had 
a territorial and political history. This is unsurprising, as much of the world is in this sense 
‘postcolonial’. But not all of it. This article focuses on Poland, often theorised as peripheral to ‘old 
Europe’, and explores the application of postcolonial analyses to this ‘other’ place. The article 
draws upon reflections arising from a study of responses to ethnic diversity in Warsaw, Poland. 
In doing so we conclude that postcolonialism does indeed offer some important insights into 
understanding Polish attitudes to other nationalities, and yet more work also needs to be done to 
make the theoretical bridge. In the case of Poland we propose the ‘triple relation’ be the starting 
point for such work.
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Introduction
Postcolonial theory has tended to focus on those spaces where European colonialism has 
had a territorial and political history. This is unsurprising, as much of the world is in this 
sense ‘postcolonial’. But what of those postsocialist states to the west of the ‘East’ and the 
Corresponding author:
Aneta Piekut, Sheffield Methods Institute (SMI), University of Sheffield, 219 Portobello, Sheffield S1 4DP, UK. 
Email: a.piekut@sheffield.ac.uk
556796 SOC0010.1177/0038038514556796SociologyMayblin et al.
research-article2014
Article
 by guest on October 26, 2016soc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
2 Sociology 
east of the ‘West’? Former Soviet ‘colonies’ experiencing new western imperialisms at the 
same time as adjusting to their ‘transition’ to capitalism? Postcolonial theory has much 
to offer to social and cultural studies of postsocialist spaces and a growing number of 
scholars in Eastern Europe have been arguing as much in recent years, particularly in 
Poland (Carey and Raciborski, 2004; Cavanagh, 2004; Deltecheva, 1998; Janion, 2006; 
Kania, 2009; Kuus, 2004; Owczarzak, 2009; Pickles, 2005; Skórczewski, 2006, 2009; 
Todorova, 1997; Zarycki, 2011). Yet there are limitations in this literature, particularly 
among those who offer a ‘comparative empires’ reading of postcolonial and postsocialist 
spaces. In this article we offer a reading of everyday understandings of diversity in Poland 
using postcolonial theory. Our intervention is crucially to argue that contemporary ideas 
of Polishness and otherness might be understood in terms of a triple relation: Poland as 
former colony, as former coloniser and finally in relation to the western hegemons.
In Poland, the experience of socialism and the aftermath of 1989 are fundamental to 
understanding political and public experiences and understandings of difference and 
diversity in the country (Kania, 2009). And yet, while the ‘postsocialist condition’ 
(Stenning, 2005) is important for understanding the nation and its response to difference, 
this is not the only lens through which one might look. A more long-term perspective, 
and a more complex vision of Polish society which reaches beyond postsocialism as the 
focus for analysis, can offer new insights. Presocialist histories are important in thinking 
through contemporary articulations of Polish national identity, particularly in terms of 
Polish dominance over others in the near East. The history of Poland is also cut through 
with ‘colonialisms’ – Poland experienced Soviet imperialism and was itself an imperial 
power in the Eastern European region. More recently, Poland has turned westwards and 
sought to ‘return’ to Europe (both politically and culturally) and in a sense to learn to be 
European again, for example through the European Union (EU) and NATO enlargement 
processes (Kuus, 2004). The old colonial powers of Western Europe, within this context, 
have exerted significant imperial influence over trajectories of social difference in 
multiple spheres of national life.
We draw here on data from in-depth biographical interviews with Poles living in 
Warsaw conducted within a larger research project ‘Living with difference in Europe: 
Making communities out of strangers in an era of super mobility and super diversity’ (see 
Mayblin et al., 2014; Piekut et al., 2012; Valentine et al., 2014). On the basis of a repre-
sentative survey on attitudes and encounters with difference in Warsaw (N = 1499), 30 
participants were selected for a qualitative study. Three interviews were then 
conducted with each participant in Polish over a one year period in 2012 (n = 90). Each 
interview explored different ‘scales’ of experience with difference: individual, approached 
as a life history interview; urban, discussing changes in Warsaw in terms of diversity; 
and national, investigating general views on relations between Poles and various minori-
ties. The research participants represented a range of demographic characteristics, in 
terms of age, (dis)ability and socio-economic status, with some representatives of minor-
ity sexual, religious and ethnic groups (see summary of respondents’ profile in Table 1). 
Interviews were verbatim transcribed, coded and analysed using qualitative data 
software. We draw on these data to illustrate the means by which postcolonial theories 
and concepts might offer insight into research in Poland today. More specifically, we 
propose that thinking Poland postcolonially offers much in terms of understanding both 
national identity and ideas of ‘otherness’ in the country.
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Poland through a Postcolonial Lens
In recent years a growing number of scholars in Poland have begun to explore the 
possible application of postcolonial concepts (see Janion, 2006; Kania, 2009; 
Skórczewski, 2006, 2009; Zarycki, 2005), predominantly drawing on an analysis of 
discourse. This work falls into two divergent strands which might be labelled ‘compara-
tive empires’ and ‘theoretical insights’. Such discussions rarely draw on individual 
narratives which reflect everyday encounters with difference. In the comparative empires 
perspective Poland is seen as a country historically colonised by Soviet Russia. The 
contemporary situation can therefore be interpreted in the same way that the postcolonial 
experience of other European colonies might be understood. Here, the central questions 
are around Polish identity (and anxieties around identity) in relation to their former 
Russian overlords (Fiut, 2007: 34). This line of investigation has clear limitations, not 
least in the practical complexity of Soviet colonialism, the question of whether the 
ambition of world socialism ‘counts’ as colonialism, and the local articulations of the 
relationship. Furthermore, this approach also falls victim to the central danger of this 
intellectual project: re-inscribing the colonial relation between East and West. 
Furthermore, postcolonial theories emerged in connection with leftist discourse and were 
mainly developed by Marxist scholars during the Cold War. This, as Korek (2007) has 
pointed out, makes the notion of Soviet Russia being a colonising power problematic. 
Soviet Russia supported the decolonisation process of countries that were ‘oppressed by 
capitalism’, taking the role of the only non-colonial empire.
The promise of postcolonial theory is not, we would argue, in engaging in the work of 
comparative empires, or to say that the postsocialist East can be subsumed into a postco-
lonial understanding of the world which foregrounds the western empires. Rather, where 
the application may work is through using some of the tools of postcolonial theory to 
better understand the Eastern European experience, while also acknowledging that the 
hegemonic discourse of western enlightenment has a variety of spheres of influence, one 
of which is within Europe itself. Some postcolonial concepts might therefore be helpful 
Table 1. Demographic profile of respondents (N = 30).
Characteristic No. Characteristic No.
Gender Female 15 Nationality Polish 28
Male 15 Other 2
Age group 18–34 11 Religion Catholic 25
35–59 12 Other religion 2
60+ 7 No religion 3
Marital status Single 13 Place of birth Warsaw 13
Married 11 Other city in Poland 16
 Other 6 Abroad 1
Disability No 25 Work status Student 6
Yes 5 Employed 18
Sexual orientation Heterosexual 28 Unemployed 2
Other 2 Retired & permanently sick 4
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here, such as: orientalism, hybridity, giving voice and speaking back, time as space and 
contesting the project of ‘modernity’ (from modernisation to multiple modernities 
and beyond) (Bhabha, 2005 [1994]; Bhambra, 2007; Eisenstadt, 2002; Said, 1978, 1994; 
Spivak, 1988).
Postcolonialists, over the past 35 years, have called for a dramatic change in the way 
colonialism is approached. The central concern is with the narrative of modernity. 
Modernity has both temporal and geographical dimensions. The temporal concerns 
rupture – the idea that at some point in time something happened to western societies 
which transformed them from pre-modern into modern societies. The Renaissance, the 
French Revolution and the industrial revolution form the key pillars of this story, together 
facilitating the Enlightenment, the emergence of democracy and the rise of capitalism in 
the West (Bhambra, 2007). This narrative reaffirms the idea that some places in the world 
are today modern, while some are not. Combined with the temporal variable, this 
logically means that some societies are ‘behind’ western societies, existing in their past 
rather than in a global present. Modernity is therefore commonly theorised as simultane-
ously distinctive and Western European in its origins. What is interesting for our case is 
that postcolonial scholars often generalise about Europe, implying that the whole 
continent might be subsumed into their critique. And yet not all of Europe pursued 
representative democracy, capitalism or human rights (key indicators of modernity) 
at the same point in time as the ‘western core’. This peripherality to conceptions of 
modernity raises interesting questions for sociology in postsocialist spaces.
In looking at attitudes towards Poland and Poles in Western European countries through 
a postcolonial lens one can observe politicians, the media and the public at large drawing 
on colonial tropes of East and West, setting Poland within a wider civilisational hierarchy 
(Spigelman, 2013). However, if we look at perspectives from within Poland then the 
discourses drawn upon are different – unsurprisingly, the relation is not reversed. There is, 
in fact, a triple relation apparent: the relation to Russia (complex in itself as this was not 
an example simply of another colonialism), and then there is a countervailing relation to 
‘the West’ as an alternative ideological hegemon, the discourse around which draws on 
themes of western superiority, on orientalism. Then, there is the relation to eastern and 
third world ‘others’, including those living in the pre-war Polish territories in the near 
East, who are often viewed in civilisational terms. Poland’s position within this discursive 
framing is not simply an ‘inbetweeness’ (in between East and West), as some scholars 
have argued (Galbraith, 2004; Janion, 2011), it is something much more complex. These 
three axes operate in parallel, and the outcomes of competing discourses, spheres of 
influence, racial and social hierarchies, distinctions between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’, the 
‘self’ and the ‘other’ manifest themselves in complex and contradictory ways.
This triple perspective resonates with Kuus’s (2004) analysis of the European 
discourse on EU and NATO enlargement. Kuus suggests that the Cold War era binary 
division of Europe into communist and capitalist changed in the early 2000s, as powerful 
European actors began to divide the continent into three different regions: the European/
Western core, the Central European applicants and eastern peripheral states which are 
not yet European enough to join the EU (e.g. post-Soviet republics), or at all (i.e. Russia, 
Turkey). Kuus (2004) has proposed that other studies should look at how these ‘othering’ 
frames are used in the ‘power margins’ (Central and Eastern European countries). 
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This article follows this question by situating ‘inscriptions of otherness’ in the Polish 
historical and geo-political context. Specifically, we explore how the triple relation 
influences people’s responses to diversity and how the responses are aligned with 
different narratives of modernity. The next three subsections address the three aspects of 
the triple relation.
Poland as a Formerly Colonised Country
Poland has experienced multiple histories of colonisation by external powers. In the 18th 
century Poland disappeared from the European map and the country was partitioned 
three times – by the Russian Empire, the Kingdom of Prussia and the Austrian Monarchy 
(1772, 1793 and 1795). Poland was deprived of sovereignty for 123 years, during which 
time ethnic Poles were pressured into cultural assimilation and experienced discrimina-
tion as a minority. Partial sovereignty was regained after the Congress of Vienna in 1815 
which resulted in the creation of the Kingdom of Poland (1815–1918, known also as 
Congress Poland or ‘Vistula Land’ (rus.: Priwislinskij Kraj)). Poland remained politi-
cally integrated with Russia, though seized some limited independence after failed upris-
ings in November 1830 and January 1863. From 1945 to 1989 the Polish People’s 
Republic (PPR) was a satellite of Soviet Russia. This period has been recognised by 
many as another colonisation, with Soviet Russia acting as a coloniser (Moore, 2001) or 
as a semi-coloniser (Carey and Raciborski, 2004), since Poland was officially an inde-
pendent state, but its internal and international politics were profoundly controlled by the 
leaders of the Soviet bloc countries.
As this brief historical account shows, Poland has experienced multiple phases of 
colonial domination in a variety of forms. This, and particularly the 20th-century experi-
ence of independence and independence-in-domination by Russia, has had a profound 
impact upon contemporary Polish national identity (Janion, 2011). Some scholars argue 
that a dislike of the Russian people is the ‘glue that holds Polish identity together’ 
(Janion, 2011: 6). One of the central popular anxieties around relations with Russia is the 
perception of Russia as a threat. The stereotype of ‘threatening Russia’ was reinforced 
during the Second World War and communicated to younger generations. One of our 
respondents, a woman born in the inter-war period in formerly Polish Vilnius, shared 
painful stories about the wartime period and post-war resettlement in Poland. When 
referring to Russian people or language she always used the disrespectful term ‘Ruski’ 
(so called ‘Russkis’). Her father fought in the Home Army, which did not accept the 
pro-Soviet communist authorities that emerged at the end of the war. Thus, as she 
explains, the hatred of Russia ‘came from home’. While her husband was a Communist 
Party member sympathising with the Soviet Union, her son was virulently anti-Russian. 
When her son refused to learn Russian at school she felt ambivalent:
My [son] said, for example, he will not learn Ruski in school. I went to my son’s [school] (…), 
I was constantly called by Ruski teacher to come there, [because] he won’t learn Ruski. [My son 
said] ‘I won’t learn!’ [Happily] I admired him on the one hand, he is so tough, I was delighted, 
but I had straight A’s in Ruski (…) I guess, because I was brought up there, in those regions and 
I was quite good at Ruski. I was good. I still buy Ruski [cigarettes], I read to my grandson what 
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is written here [Respondent shows cigarettes with Russian inscriptions], (because) they are 
cheaper. (Alina, 76)
Another woman reflected on her memories about Russian people who lived in Warsaw 
during the socialist period. She perceived Russian people as those who ‘stifled’ Poles. 
Today, though, she is aware of her prejudice and is self-critical, yet she cannot escape it:
As I tried to get a job, I went to the Ministry. One day I was standing at the door, waiting for 
someone to come (…) [and] I heard a conversation in Russian on the phone. And my hair stood 
on end. What are the Russians doing in our Ministry of Education? I’ve always been so 
suspicious about them. When I heard the conversation in Russian on the street I thought ‘Oh, 
those people again, those who want to stifle us here.’ At the moment I no longer have this very 
suspicious and reluctant attitude to them, but I can’t say I love them. I am aware that authority 
and society are two different things, but society is unfortunately prone to do what 
authority says. (…)
Did you meet any Russians here in Warsaw?
No, I didn’t meet any Russians, and probably wouldn’t want to. I’d be afraid that I could at 
some point show my dislike and someone would be sorry. (Danuta, 67)
In this account the respondent admits that Russia no longer poses any threat to Poles and 
yet fears around being stifled, as she puts it, continue. Following 1989 the popular press 
has framed the Russian threat as an issue of gas supply, and more recently in the form of 
conspiracy theories around the Smoleńsk presidential plane crash in 2010, which 
happened close to one of the symbols of martyrdom of Poles during the Second World 
War (Zubrzycki, 2011).
In countering this sense of threat, Poles have developed multiple negative representa-
tions of Russians which cast Russia as weaker politically, more ‘backward’, and less 
civilised – the former ‘coloniser’ has become ‘the other’. For example, in discussing the 
debate on the possibility of introducing same-sex civil partnership in Poland, one 
respondent used Russia as a reference society whose fate Poles should avoid. In this 
context, Russia remains ‘less advanced’ from the perspective of the European narrative 
on modernity in that it lacks compliance with international equality laws. Poland pos-
sesses a moral superiority and could avoid the Russian fate (Zarycki, 2004). Therefore, 
rather than depicting Russian equality and human rights laws as simply ineffective or 
limited, the discourse sites this limitation within a temporal and spatial narrative – some 
countries are lagging behind the modern West and should catch up. Lagging behind is 
implicated in lacking ‘civilisation’.
This orientalising perspective has been transposed onto Polish regions that were 
governed by Russia during partition. The post-Prussian and post-Austro-Hungarian 
regions are remembered as regions of prosperity and modernisation, while any economic 
successes and progressive social and voluntary work that occurred in the past and are 
occurring today in the formerly Russian regions are silenced or forgotten (Zarycki, 
2008). This ‘discourse of competences’ is often applied to the eastern territories of 
Poland, which are perceived as more ‘backward’ because of their historical connections 
with Russia, while the positive legacies of Russian influence in these regions are 
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overlooked (Zarycki, 2011). Negative views on these regions especially prevail among 
young people. For example, one interviewee described the town where his grandparents 
live in eastern Poland as a more superstitious place and with amusement, mimicking the 
eastern Polish accent.
The social and cultural hegemony of the Russian Empire was therefore only margin-
ally successful in Poland. Some scholars link this failure of the Russian colonial project 
with the Polish ‘inferiority–superiority complex’ – a sense of inferiority in relation to the 
West, alongside high levels of Polish national pride (Kurczewska, 2003). Perhaps 
because Poles feel inferior (insufficiently modern and European) in relation to the West 
(Kuus, 2004), they have developed a disrespectful attitude towards other ‘more eastern’ 
and ‘even less European’ countries. However, in the Polish context the negotiations of 
‘easternness’ are marked by centuries of difficult history of being neighbours or citizens 
within one national organism; a history that spans well beyond the recent post-1989 
transformations and EU enlargement.
Poland as a Coloniser: ‘Orientalisation’ of Borderlands
The territory of present day Poland, like many states, differs considerably from previous 
incarnations of the country. From the 14th century up to 1945 the Polish eastern borders 
were located approximately 200 km south-east of their present location, incorporating the 
territories of contemporary western Belarus, western Ukraine and eastern Latvia. 
Following considerable changes to the Polish territories introduced with the Yalta 
Conference in 1945, Poland was moved westwards, and the eastern territories were lost 
while some western and northern regions (including almost the entire Upper and Lower 
Silesia, Pomerania, Lubusz Land, parts of Greater Poland, Kuyavia, Warmia and Masuria) 
were incorporated and named the Regained Territories. Polish people living in the former 
Polish territories in eastern neighbouring countries were repatriated to Poland and mostly 
to the Regained Territories in parallel with German repatriations in the same area.
The lost eastern territories have colloquially been named the ‘Eastern Borderlands’ 
and over time a nostalgic and idealising discourse built upon mythologies of a ‘lost 
homeland’ created during the partitions has emerged (Bakuła, 2007). However, histori-
cally these eastern territories were never considered to be ethnically Polish in terms of 
their population. The territories of contemporary Belarus and Ukraine were conquered in 
the 14th and 15th century by the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania 
and incorporated into the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth (common elective 
monarchy, 1569–1795). These territories were a mix of people of different ethnicities 
and religions (Catholic, Orthodox and Jewish). People in the Commonwealth had, in 
theory, the same rights and privileges irrespective of their ethnicity (introduced by the 
Warsaw Confederation 1573), but the rights were limited to nobility (10 per cent of the 
population). Ethnic and religious differences were interwoven with social and class 
divisions, with Polish gentry, who had more economic resources and power, being 
significantly advantaged in this context (Gella, 1989: 13; Snochowska-Gonzales, 2012).
During the Commonwealth period the eastern border was perceived by Poles as a 
territory where nomadic Cossacks, Tartars and people who came as ‘fugitives from 
serfdom’ led ungoverned lives, so it was represented both as a space of freedom and a 
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space of fear (Janion, 2006). These perceptions reflect one of the central national myths 
– Catholic Poland as a bulwark of Christendom defending Europe against the infidel, 
against the barbarian and against the Asian threat (Wise, 2010a; Zubrzycki, 2011). The 
Borderlands became a space of nationalistic tension in the time of Poland’s regaining of 
independence, specifically with Ukrainian people (e.g. war over the Eastern Galicia 
regions, 1918–1919, ‘Massacres in Volynia’, 1943–1944). The imperialistic approach 
towards people living in these territories (assimilation was expected into the socio- 
cultural norms of contemporary Poland) and the homogenising mythologies of the Polish 
national identity were strengthened by socialist national policy (Copsey, 2008). All these 
experiences have been incorporated into the national collective memory (Konieczna, 
2001). One of our research participants was born in south-east Poland in an area which 
until 1945 was Polish and is currently Ukrainian, a region of Polish–Ukrainian clashes in 
the period 1943–1944. Stories of the massacre were passed to younger generations and 
the term ‘Ukrainian’ has become a powerful symbol of the ‘other’ that has deeply shaped 
her attitudes, even to things that belong to the Ukrainian people, such as animals: ‘it’s not 
our dog, but Ukrainian dog, we can say, dog which belongs to people who murdered us. 
Somehow, it’s a psyche, it’s scary’ (Urszula, 52). When she moved to Warsaw she rented 
a room in her flat to a girl who dated a Ukrainian boy. The couple broke up and in her 
justifications she drew a connection between her beliefs regarding Ukrainians and 
her encounter with the Ukrainian boy:
I had some terrible expectations of Ukrainians, really terrible. They told me that they were 
there, they killed, they murdered, they nailed children to walls, it was simply, it’s what I heard 
from my grandma, my grandma told me such stories (…)
And in the course of time, when you got to know this boy better, did your attitude change? How 
was it?
I mean, that’s why I imagined that, that he may hurt this girl. Somehow, I didn’t feel it would 
be all right. And it turned out that he hurt her because he left her afterwards. He left her. He 
promised wonders, he promised to marry her and so on, that they would be together, and then 
he said: ‘You know, I want to date also other women.’ (…) she slept with him. Even, I shouldn’t 
say it, but he perhaps infected her, because she visited a gynaecologist and she said that she 
contracted some disease (…). So I don’t think of Ukrainians in positive terms, quite the 
contrary, my attitude is, that they are, we shouldn’t generalise, maybe it’s only my imagination, 
maybe I don’t know, maybe somebody says it and I just repeat it. (Urszula, 52)
These memories around the brutality of Borderland relations have been interpreted as 
indications of failings in the Ukrainian character. The Ukrainian boy is racialised, since 
his actions are not seen as personal failings, but as a reflection of his ‘Ukrainian nature’. 
The contemporary migration of Ukrainians, Belarussians and citizens of other eastern 
neighbour countries (the major immigration source) adds another dimension to discur-
sive constructions around the relations with the ‘Borderlands’. ‘Borderland people’ are 
again living among Poles, and more importantly, many of them have some Polish roots 
or family relations (Konieczna-Sałamatin, 2011), so the association of these people with 
‘otherness’ becomes complicated by the banal realities of everyday life. A common 
representation of Ukrainians as a poor and economically ‘backward’ nation, and the 
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association of Ukrainian immigrants with undocumented migration and illegal working 
(Konieczna, 2001) was also present among our respondents. One respondent in our 
research spoke of her Ukrainian sister-in-law. In her story she relates her son’s immigra-
tion experience, who lived in the UK and now resides in Sweden, to her own experiences 
in the labour market. Working as a domestic help she competes with mostly Ukrainian 
women as she says, ‘I don’t mind that she is Ukrainian at all’:
You know what, but if our [Polish] people move to other countries, then they perceive us 
similarly there. (…) So this is the natural order, everybody takes away [jobs]. Sure, I was 
annoyed many times because they [Ukrainian women] raise price, they unreasonably raise 
prices. (…) Well, because there are a lot of them, for example cleaning and keeping a house. 
There are a lot of these Belorussians and Ukrainians and they take up jobs and raise prices, they 
even have higher salaries than we do. (…) So, yeah, something has changed. Back then, I didn’t 
mind, now it is a bit different. (…) And it is because they are employed more often … Because 
we have got families, we come back somewhere. And they usually stay over [in Poland]. (…) 
Possibly, they come and are ready to work at anyone’s beck and call. Unlike us. Because I’ve 
got eight hours and I go back home. So it is different. Well, but for example my sister-in-law 
works shorter hours in Poland and has the same salary as I do. (Celina, 58)
Similar stories were shared by other respondents who perceived economic immi-
grants from the eastern neighbouring states as those who do not ‘deserve’ to have the 
same salary as Polish people. However, through the same means of migratory experience 
Poland has moved closer to the ‘western core’, because it has become an attractive des-
tination country for immigrants. These accounts provide evidence that citizens of the 
Central and East European countries negotiate their own degrees of ‘easternness’ or 
‘westernness’ in relation to other countries of the region (Kuus, 2004), especially those 
in close proximity (Siemieńska, 1996). Past Polish emigration was compared with 
contemporary immigration, particularly from the eastern neighbouring countries:
Although their [immigrants] status is certainly worse, like usually in the case of gastarbeiters 
[ger.], but … it tickles my national pride, that we used to go to Germany to pick up strawberries 
and we went to saksy [pol., a colloquial term for a seasonal job abroad], to a bauer [ger.]. (…) 
And now we’ve become ‘the West’ and other nations come to us, and we are almost these masters 
[pol. ‘paniska’]. We give them jobs, they clean up, they build, they babysit. (Henryk, 66)
In this relation ‘modernity’ appears as a ‘colonisation of space and time’ (Mignolo, 2011: 
6); this ‘lower’, less empowered social positioning is ascribed to a specific region 
(Eastern Europe), but is also associated with the ‘past’ Poland, and thus is presented as 
more immature. The narrative on the Borderlands is also reflected in the feeling of 
responsibility, emotional attachments (‘lost homeland’) and, in turn, a paternalistic 
approach towards these regions which could be taught by Poland how to become 
European (especially Ukraine, Bakuła, 2007). Reverse mechanisms seem to be in opera-
tion in relation to Jewish people, who also represent a former multicultural facet of 
pre-war Poland, but are not visible and encountered on the same daily basis as immi-
grants from the East are. This group was ‘imagined’ by respondents as more dominant in 
relation to Poles (understood in socio-economic terms and power relations; see Kofta 
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and Bilewicz, 2011), which could not be ‘orientalised’ and described as a ‘backward 
other’ (Snochowska-Gonzales, 2012). It could be argued that this ‘colonising incapacity’ 
constitutes a source of uneasiness and prejudice. As such, the triple relation does not 
fully explain anti-Semitism or any other prejudice, but it helps to uncover how everyday 
encounters with ‘others’, even if they are ‘imagined encounters’, are relationally bound 
with different narratives of hegemonic relations and contestations of previously ‘subal-
tern’ positioning of Polish people.
Poland and the Western ‘Hegemons’
Until the 9th century Poland was a pagan country. In the 10th century the Polish duke 
Mieszko I decided to convert to Christianity, but according to Latin, as opposed to 
Slavonic, rite. Since then Poland has had a stronger relation with western Latin religious 
culture and thought. Janion (2006) sees this event in Polish history as the starting point 
of a national identity split between the East (represented by Slavdom) and the West. The 
subsequent history of Poland, during which stronger links with the Russian Empire 
developed, has only reinforced this tension. Some scholars argue that the aspirations of 
being included into Western Europe and accepted as not a ‘barbarian Slavonic’ people, 
has led to the creation of a para-colonial relationship with western countries (Buchowski, 
2006; Kuus, 2004; Thompson, 2010).
Thompson (2010) describes the relationship between Poland and the ‘West’ as a 
‘surrogate hegemon’. She traces its roots in the period of partitions (1773/1795–1914) 
and argues that similar processes were at work in the socialist period. In both periods 
large numbers of Polish intelligentsia emigrated from Poland and with them the narrative 
on Polish socio-cultural life was relocated outside Poland. The narratives developed by 
Polish intellectuals in Western Europe – who were seeking explanations for the partitions 
or commented on internal affairs in socialist Poland – confirmed the inferiority of Polish 
society and, according to Thompson (2010: 4; for critique see Snochowska-Gonzales, 
2012), Poles started internalising the orientalising gaze of the West, but at the same time 
‘they tended to transfer the notion of inferiority onto the lower social strata in Poland, or 
onto those strata that did not subscribe to the Enlightenment slogans about progress and 
secular development of humanity’. Through the decades Poles adopted the discourse of 
the conquerors, blaming themselves for the failure of the Polish state, at the same time as 
the belief in western supremacy grew stronger. This orientalist perspective which casts 
Poland as traditional and behind the West was present among our informants too. 
Reflecting on changes that have occurred in Poland in the last two decades, Jakub 
perceives current public debates in Poland, those represented mainly by politicians who 
shape the discourse, as parochial in relation to western political culture. He explains:
When you are saying that Poland is parochial, then?
(…) But still in certain situations, being parochial means that we are far away from this Western 
Europe, we are far away in terms of thinking, perceiving certain issues. And, as I’ve mentioned, 
politicians are to blame. (…)
What’s the difference between thinking of western politicians and our Polish politicians?
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I will put it differently – our politicians’ mentality in certain cases, as I’ve said, with respect to 
otherness, generally, otherness, and so on, they are simply, they think like in the past. (Jakub, 36)
This description of ‘thinking like in the past’, while western politicians presumably think 
in a new mode which is distinct from old ways of thinking, reflects the articulation of 
ideas of modernisation and progress which are often taken for granted. The year 1989 
brought independence and a chance to re-establish and reassess relationships with both 
the West and the East. Neoliberal politics privileged the modernisation discourse of ‘tran-
sition’ which positions Poland (and other postsocialist countries) as lagging behind the 
capitalist West. In this period postsocialist Poles again internalised the orientalist gaze 
which depicted the country as ‘backward’. Much like the partition periods, Polish intel-
lectual elites identified societal groups ‘responsible’ for the failure of the national state 
after 1989. Some people were marked as ‘domestic others’ or ‘losers of transformation’ – 
those who are automatically proved to fail to adapt and to be ‘civilisationally incompe-
tent’ or are unable to reject old mental habits, the homo sovieticus complex, who do not 
fit into this new civilised, post-communist reality of capitalism and progress (Buchowski, 
2006). This internal orientalisation justifies a para-colonial relationship with western 
societies, casting them as more modern and representing a future which Poles aspire to, 
of underdeveloped ‘East’ and the civilised ‘West’ (Kania, 2009).
Domański (2004) suggests that the ideology of ‘catching up’ reinforces the accept-
ance of external influences, and a sense of exclusion from European integration after the 
Second World War leads to the acceptance of the recipient role and in turn to the 
reproduction of the East–West division. While assessing the Polish role in the European 
Union respondents in our research in Warsaw were appreciative of the financial benefits 
that accession to the EU brought, the active role that European institutions take in Polish 
domestic policies was rarely mentioned. Assessing Polish accession to the EU, respond-
ents focused on differences in the standard of living that exist between Poland and 
Western Europe. The West was not only represented as better in terms of labour market 
opportunities and conditions, but also as ‘more developed’ in terms of social care and 
welfare, despite the fact that Poland was a ‘socialist welfare state’ in the past (Golinowska, 
1994). Barbara, who has been the primary full-time carer for her disabled husband for 
more than 10 years, suggested that Western European countries represent a comfortable 
life to which she aspires:
So, those centres [for disabled] were founded, right, this is thanks to the European Union 
probably, but we are far behind, when it comes to any social assistance, suppose. I also had an 
uncle in West Germany, (…) [and] his wife died, he was left alone and he was also after the 
stroke, he immediately had such care as it should be, they brought him absolutely, completely 
out of it. Later (…) he had home care, a young woman did everything there until he died, right. 
Here [in Poland] there is no such assistance. (…) Social welfare in the West is more developed. 
(Barbara, 62)
The internalisation of the narrative of modernity is clear in this quote. Though the arrival 
of capitalism brought an end to many social provisions in Poland, it is not the Soviet 
Union that was ‘ahead’, but Western Europe. While state social care is being eroded in 
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Western European countries as neoliberal capitalist economic agendas have risen to 
prominence (and in that sense the West is behind itself in terms of social welfare), what 
provision there is, nevertheless presents a future with which Poland shall one day ‘catch 
up’. Interestingly, here Germany is included in the western narrative not in the 
post-partition and post-war narrative, along with Russia. For example, some anti-EU 
debates regarding the possibility of buying land in Poland by foreigners were anchored 
in anti-German sentiments (Buchowski, 2010). This further exhibits the fluidity of 
discourses of the past and present with regard to relations with western hegemons.
Attitudes towards western countries are, indeed, a mix of desire and resentment, a 
negotiation, an ambivalent hybrid (Bhabha, 2005 [1994]). Western countries receive the 
highest scores in public opinion polls on perceptions of other nations, and have done for 
many years (CBOS, 2013). For decades Western Europe and the United States have 
constituted migration destinations for economic migrants from Poland and have been 
popularly depicted as ‘promised lands’ of prosperity. At the same time, Poles acknowl-
edge that they are not always seen as desirable citizens in the West, and they have 
developed ‘a complex of the unwanted child’ (Horolets and Kozłowska, 2012: 51). Being 
‘unwanted’ results in a sense of an uneasiness about one’s own position among other 
European countries, being not European enough, which is overcome by attempts to prove 
Polish superiority over the West in other dimensions. Poland is therefore often depicted 
in political and media debates as morally superior to western countries and as a society 
that has not been ‘spoiled’ by changes brought about by ‘civilisational’ processes (Wise, 
2010b), for example its ethnic and religious homogeneity was valued by some. Reflecting 
on the multicultural projects pursued by some of the western countries respondents 
expressed scepticism in relation to the results in the UK, France, the Netherlands and 
Denmark. Beata, who has resided in a number of Western European countries, connected 
her Islamophobic feelings with this kind of argument:
I would very much not like for Poland to find itself in a situation like it is in France. At some 
point there was untamed immigration there. They had to accept people from the Maghreb, 
because it was their colony, and suddenly it turned out that those people were unwilling to 
integrate with society. They started living with their own enclaves, speak only in Arabic, and 
France started having whole Arabic cities. They started evicting the French from their estates 
because with time, more of them immigrated there and the value of those flats was lower, right? 
(…) Based on my observation of French, British and Dutch society, it seems that mass 
acceptance of migrants from Arabic countries has a negative impact on society in the long run.
What kind of risks are you talking about? (…)
The risk is of those people not wanting to accept the culture they are entering. (…) They don’t 
want to accept that value, those European values, they don’t want to accept human dignity, 
right? That man and woman have the same dignity and the same rights. They start living in their 
enclaves, I’m talking about the Netherlands, for example, right? They don’t learn the language, 
they act on their own law, they listen to their Imam more than, you know, the police or what the 
Dutch have to say. And for example I’d be against Warsaw, the city of Warsaw issuing a permit 
to build a mosque. (Beata, 37)
Here, racialised attitudes towards Muslim people intersect with a vision of the West, 
demonstrating how race is temporarily and spatially reconstructed (Meer and Nayak, 
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2013). As such, the applied triple relation anchored in postcolonial theory reveals the 
complexity of racialisation processes in a society that imagines its future through the 
experiences of the ‘civilised West’, to which it aspires, but also distances itself from. 
Approaching ethnic diversity from the perspective of an outsider (‘they have a problem’, 
Weinar, 2008: 5), despite being an insider in the EU, reinforces the self-representation of 
Poland as peripheral in Europe.
Discussion
This article has presented original empirical material from research investigating the 
contemporary responses of Poles to ethnic diversity. We have here employed a postcolo-
nial perspective with reference to ideas of Polishness and ‘otherness’, but, as we argue, 
these ordinary experiences have to be anchored in a long-durée perspective penetrating 
complex Polish history and hegemonic relations with other nations – either as a colo-
nised or colonising power. The application of these postcolonial lenses has demonstrated 
that attitudes towards other nationalities are not merely a result of the ‘East–West split’ 
(Galbraith, 2004) or a by-product of the ‘postsocialist condition’ (Stenning, 2005). 
Rather, we propose that the contemporary Polish condition be considered in terms of the 
triple relation: in relation to Russia as its former colony reflecting past Russian Empire 
and Soviet domination, as a former coloniser of other Eastern European nations and in 
relation to the western hegemons.
The triple relation set out in the article provides a novel framework for understanding 
Polish identity within the context of three key external influences, drawing upon some of 
the central tropes of postcolonial theory. In doing so, it was not the aim of the article to 
provide a theory of prejudice within Poland. For instance, anti-Semitism, which contin-
ues to be present in Poland, could not be fully explored (see Cała, 2012). It is worth 
noting, however, that while postcolonial theory has not adequately addressed the issue of 
anti-Semitism, we would in this context distinguish between internal and external others. 
In the Polish case, Jews were (before the Holocaust) the ‘other’ within, and remain an 
‘imagined internal other’ today. This prejudice is aligned with ideas of racial hierarchy in 
that being Jewish is related to descent, and is thus biologically unavoidable. This 
connects to popular ideas of a homogenous, mono-ethnic nation, which were pursued as 
an official policy of the state in the post-war period. Hierarchical conceptions of human-
ity and racial difference increased in Europe with the rise of the major colonial empires, 
and it was on this epistemological basis that anti-Semitism took hold in Germany and 
beyond. Racism and racialisation, including anti-Semitism, are therefore woven 
through all elements of the triple relation. As such, postcolonialism raises questions 
about dominant epistemologies which have long framed the world in hierarchical terms. 
Situating the analysis in racially homogenous Polish society paradoxically demon-
strates ‘the resilience of race as a construct for organising social relations’ and how this 
‘algebra of race’ is reconfigured across time and space selectively drawing upon past, 
present and imagined future (Meer and Nayak, 2013: 13). Through the postcolonial epis-
temological optic racial hierarchies, which include ‘invisible’ and ‘internal’ others such 
as Jews, other Eastern European nations and the working classes, go hand in hand with 
hierarchical ideas of civilisation.
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Furthermore, the triple relation exposes constraints regarding the concept of moder-
nity in its temporal and geo-political dimensions. While modernity is usually assumed to 
be a distinctive feature of western societies, the analysis provided demonstrates that 
Polish people make sense of their contemporary encounters with ethnic diversity by 
relating it to non-linear representations of past, present and future. This collective 
imaginary is relational and fluid and there is not one vision of modernity and change; for 
example Germany shifted from a category of colonisers to the western hegemons and 
Jewish people, as explained above, from ‘internal’ to ‘imagined’ others. As such, the data 
presented in this article have clearly demonstrated the ways in which ordinary people 
draw on aspects of this triple relation in making sense of both Polishness and ‘otherness’ 
in contemporary Poland. While more work is needed to develop this line of enquiry, we 
propose that concepts which have been developed in postcolonial studies have much to 
offer in terms of conceptualising and theorising processes of identity formation in 
the ‘power margins’ in Europe. Indeed, the complexities of national identities cannot be 
explained solely by historical events, but also the ways in which those events are 
subsumed into an ideological representation of past, present and future. What a postco-
lonial lens might offer, then, is an understanding of Polish national identity as mediated 
through a vision(s) of modernity: the modern society, the modern citizen, modern 
policies – what is especially important in the context of increased intra-EU mobility and 
Europeanisation of national politics. While Western Europe looms large in this framing 
of the world as a vision of the (or a possible) future, the triple relation draws attention to 
other relations also framed in terms of modernity which should be considered.
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